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Carroll v. State:

POLICE MAY
MAKE WARRANTLESS ENTRIES
INTO HOMES TO INVESTIGATE BURGLARIES UNDER
THE EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT OF
THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT.

In Carrol/v. State, 335
Md. 723,646 A.2d 376 (1994),
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that police need probable cause to believe that a burglary is either in progress or has
recently been committed to enter a home without a warrant, to
search for intruders and to protect an occupant's property. In
so ruling, the court extended the
State's scope of the exigency
exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment.
In July of 1992, Joe
Hudson ("Hudson") escaped
from a Carroll County detention center. Deputy First Class
Mark Gonder ("Gonder") and
Detectives Lust and Prise of the
Carroll County Sheriff sDepartment went to an apartment complex in Eldersburg, Maryland in
search of Hudson. A resident of
the complex, Terry Lynn Penn
("Penn"), told Gonder that
Hudson had been there the night
before but was no longer there.
Penn then allowed the officers
to search the residence of Pet itioner Mike Carroll ("Petitioner"). Before entering the residence, Gonder noticed an open
screen door, a front door which
was ajar, and a broken front
door window. The outward
appearance of the apartment
prompted Gonder to ask Penn if
the basement apartment was
secured. Penn informed the officer that the apartment had been
secured and that Petitioner
would not be home until July
25th or July 26th. The officers
then returned to Petitioner's
apartment. Gonder entered,
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announced his presence, and
discovered marijuana plants,
which were in plain view. Upon
finding that the apartment was
unoccupied, the officers did not
disturb the evidence. Ratherthe
officers secured the apartment
and left the premises to obtain a
search and seizure warrant from
a magistrate of the Circuit
Court for Carroll County. The
officers executed the warrant at
4:00 p.m. on July 24, 1992 and
seized the contraband.
On August 27, 1992,
Petitioner was indicted in the
Circuit Court for Carroll County on the following charges:
manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance; possession of
a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute;
maintaining a common nuisance;
and possession of a controlled
dangerous substance and drug
paraphernalia in violation of
Maryland Annotated Code Art.
27, §§ 286, 287, 287A (1957,
1992 Repl. Vol.). The State
alleged that the officers "had
probable cause to believe that a
burglary was in progress or had
recently been committed and
that exigent circumstances justified their initial warrantless
entry."
Conversely, Petitioner
claimed the officers violated his
Fourth Amendment rights because "the initial warrantless
entry did not fall within any of
the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement." Accordingly, Petitioner filed a timely
motion to suppress the evidence
seized from his residence. The
trial court granted Petitioner's
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motion. On appeal, the Court
of Special Appeals ofMaryland
reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to
decide whether the evidence
should have been suppressed.
Upon review, the court of appeals affirmed the finding ofthe
court of special appeals.
The court began its analysis by discussing the legality of
the initial warrantless entry and
the validity ofthe warrant. The
court first established that the
State bore the burden of proving that the initial warrantless
search was justified by exigent
circumstances and that such circum stances did, in fact, exist.
Carroll, 335 Md. at 728, 646
A.2d at 379. After reviewing
general Fourth Amendment
principles, the court turned its
attention to the exigent circumstances exception. It explained
that this exception applies when
"there is a compelling need for
official action and no time to
secure a warrant." Id at 729,
646 A. 2d at 380 (quotingMichiganv. Tyler, 436US. 499, 509
(1978».
Because the court noted that this was a case of first
impression, the court looked to
various state and federal decisions to resolve the issue before
it. Of these decisions, the most
persuasive were rendered by the
Massachusetts and Montana
courts. There, the courts permitted warrantless burglary investigations to protect both occupants and property, and to

apprehend suspects. Id. at 73233, 646 A.2d at 381. After
reaching a similar conclusion,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland supported its ruling by suggesting that to require officers
to leave the scene of a crime to
secure a warrant during emergent situations would be futile.
Such a requirement would allow intruders the opportunity to
"complete their crimes undisturbed." Id at 734, 646 A.2dat
382.
In expanding the scope
ofthe exigency exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement in Maryland, the court
noted two specific restrictions.
First, police must weigh the need
to investigate against the risk of
the "serious invasions of privacy such entries and searches
entail." Id at 734,646 A.2d at
382. Second, the Court warned
against using the "[ r]ationale of
protecting private property ...
as a subterfuge to seek out evidence of criminal conduct." Id
at 734,646 A.2d at 382 (citing
People v. Gardner, 459 NE.2d
676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984».
In reaching its decision,
the court also considered whether the facts supported the officers' reasonable beliefs at the
time of the warrantless entry.
More specifically, the court addressed whether the officers had
probable cause to believe that
either a housebreak occurred or
that an intruder was on the premises. Id at 735, 646 A.2d at
382. Next, the court conducted
its "own constitutional appraisal" of the facts of the case before it. Id at 736, 646 A.2d at

383. In so doing, the court
observed that the appearance of
a "forced entry" compounded
by information that an escaped
convict had been in the area
created a "compelling" need
for the officers to investigate.
Id at 738-39, 646 A.2d at 384.
Furthermore, the court was convinced that the "presence or
absence ofsuspects within Petitioner's apartment could not be
ascertained without entering the
premises." Id at 739,646 A.2d
at 384 (citing State v. Bakke,
723 P.2d 534 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986». Hence, the court found
that the initial entry was lawful
based upon exigent circumstances and the officer's "observations were proper grounds for a
search warrant under the plain
view doctrine." Carroll, 335
Md. at 740, 646 A.2d at 385
(citing Horton v. California, 496
US. 128 (1990». The court
further determined that the officers entered the premises for
the sole purpose of investigating a burglary. Furthermore,
proper procedures were followed upon entrance. Specifically, the entering officer announced his presence and observed contraband in plain view.
The evidence was left "undisturbed," while the sheriffs left
the premises to secure a search
warrant based upon their initial
observations. Carroll, 335 Md.
at 740, 646 A.2d at 385.
In his dissent, Judge Bell
with whom Judge Eldridge
joined, asserted that the initial
entry into Petitioner's home was
based upon speculation rather
than probable cause. Because
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the officers were told that the
escapee was no longer on the
premises, the dissent was
unpersuaded by a hot pursuit
theory.ld. at 746 n.2, 646 A.2d
at 388 n.2. Essentially, the
dissent was not convinced that
there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into Petitioner's home. Specifically, Judge Bell pointed out
that because the Petitioner was
not in his apartment the need to
assist the occupant was also
unwarranted. Id at 746-47,
646 A.2d at 388.
Moreover, the dissenting opinion specifically determined that the "temporal context" of the circumstances of
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the case was inconsistent with
exigency. Id 'at 747, 646 A.2d
at 388. As a result, Judge Bell
maintained that it was "difficult
to conceive of what legitimate
inferences could be drawn which
would have permitted entry."
Id at747,646A.2dat388. The
dissent further noted that once
property is stolen, the need to
protect it is unnecessary. I d at
748,646 A.2d at 388. In short,
the only valid option was "to
secure the premises . . . so that
no additional property would be
taken. That could have been
accomplished without entering
the premises." Id at 748, 646
A.2d at 389. An overriding
concern of the dissent was that
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the majority opinion neutralized
the "emergent nature of exigency" thus making "the exception ... the rule." I d at 748,
646 A.2d at 389.
Significantly, Carroll v.
State sets anew and controversial precedent in Maryland regarding the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement oftheFourth Amendment. By expanding the exigency exception to include l~giti
mate burglary investigations,
law enforcement officers are
provided greater latitude to protect the safety and property of
Maryland residents.
- Kimberley S. Wright Jones
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